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The 1997 collective bargaining agreement between the Major League Baseball owners
and players’ union altered MLB’s system of sharing revenue sharing between clubs. The new
system, a convoluted cross-subsidization scheme, by design progressively redistributed income
from the highest revenue generating clubs toward the lowest revenue-producing clubs. The 2003
agreement extended this method of revenue redistribution, but with an increased the tax rate and
modified process. The purpose of the revenue sharing system was to alleviate a growing disparity
in revenue generation, which MLB claimed caused competitive imbalance. We examine
progressive revenue sharing theoretically, within the principal-agent framework, and shows that
the incentive to divest in talent is increased for lower revenue producing clubs. Empirical results
are supportive. Payroll disparity and competitive imbalance increased modestly from the period
immediately preceding implementation. Most striking however is the alteration in transfer rates
of players, in particular the increased flow of productive talent away from the lowest revenue
clubs. We show conclusively that low revenue producing clubs acted on the increased incentives
to divest in talent. 
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1. Introduction 
  The 1997 Basic Agreement
1  (1997BA), the collective bargaining agreement between the 
Major League Baseball (MLB) owners and the players’ union (Major League Baseball Players 
Association, MLBPA) considerably altered MLB’s system for collecting and redistributing club 
generated revenues.  Under the previous system, the sharing of club generated income in MLB 
consisted of primarily a small, fixed-percent, of gate receipts due the visiting club.
2  A 
progressive cross-subsidization system, initially known as the “split pool plan”, replaced the 
simple gate sharing method.  The innovative system is described as progressive here, because by 
design increasingly larger shares of the pooled income—all revenue collected by the league and 
designated for redistribution—are awarded to the lowest revenue-producing clubs.  The levy on 
local revenues was phased in gradually over the length of the 1997BA reaching a maximum of 
rate 20% in 2001. The 2003 Basic Agreement (2003BA) extended the basic system of 
progressive revenue redistribution through the 2006 season.  The tax rate on local revenues 
increased to a constant rate of 34% for each year of the term of the 2003BA.   
  The affirmed purpose of the progressive revenue sharing system was to alleviate a 
growing disparity in club specific (local) revenue generation, which MLB has claimed to cause 
increased levels of competitive imbalance.  MLB Commissioner, Alan “Bud” Selig, was 
adamant and persistent with his 1997 declaration that growing revenue disparity distorts 
competitive balance and causes severe economic problems because fans in small market cities 
                                                 
1 Though agreed to by MLB and the MLBPA in 1997 revenue sharing provisions of the agreement were retroactive 
to the 1996 season. 
2 The actual home-visitor share was different in each of the two leagues. Fort and Quirk (1995, p. 1286) report that 
the American League (AL) split was an 80%:20% home team to visiting team ratio; the National League (NL) home 
team share was 95%.  
  3have lost “hope and faith” of a championship.  Selig cited as evidence the MLB commissioned 
report, completed by the so-called “Blue Ribbon Panel” of experts (hereafter the BRPR),which 
showed clubs in the highest payroll quartile had won more than 90% of all playoff games since 
1994.  Notwithstanding, independent economists have pointed out the fallacies of this report 
(Eckard 2001, for example).  Throughout both the 1997 and 2003 collective bargaining 
negotiations, MLB implored the MLBPA to agree to adopt measures that correct competitive 
imbalance. In addition to progressive revenue sharing, a luxury tax on payrolls was implemented 
through the 1997BA and continued, albeit in different form, (and renamed the competitive 
balance tax) with the 2003BA.  
The MLB revenue sharing scheme was innovative because the league collects a fixed 
percentage of all net local revenues.  This tax on each club’s local revenue is pooled with league-
generated income, primarily national broadcast and licensing revenue, and provides the total 
fund, known as the central pool, set for redistribution.  The principal-agent framework provides 
an appropriate method by which to examine progressive revenue sharing.  A basic construction, 
defining the league as the principal and the individual clubs (owners) as the agents, shows 
institutional changes imposed by progressive revenue sharing bring about a new set of agent 
incentives.  The intended effect is to restrain the rate of talent acquisition by high-income clubs 
by reducing the marginal revenue associated with winning.  Simultaneously, the redistributions 
provide low-income clubs with additional resources that may assist them in the procurement of 
talent and consequently improve competitive balance.  Notwithstanding, the subsidy received by 
low-revenue clubs is inversely proportional to the amount of local revenue generated; the 
unintended consequence is thus, that the incentive to win—conditioned on the principle that wins 
and revenue generation are positively correlated—is reduced for low revenue clubs. The 
progressive revenue sharing plan effectively increases the marginal tax rate on the lowest 
  4revenue producing clubs, decreasing their incentive to produce wins and the corresponding 
increases in local revenue.  
  Conventional wisdom holds that increasing the level of revenue sharing among its clubs 
will diminish problems of competitive imbalance in a professional sports league.  The economic 
effects of pooling and sharing revenues in professional sports leagues has been examined by a 
number of writers, beginning with the rigorous economic model of a sports league by Quirk and 
El Hodiri (1971).
3 The theoretical conclusions, rightly pointed out by Kesenné (2000), are 
inconsistent, and often vary given the stated assumptions, such as those placed on owner 
behavior.  Fort and Quirk (1995) showed that basic gate revenue sharing has no effect on 
balance, but does depress player salaries.  Others, including Atkinson et al. (1988), Fort and 
Quirk (1995), Vrooman (1995 and 1996), Rascher (1997), Marburger (1997), and Kesenné 
(2000) each provided substantiation that under certain circumstances revenue sharing improves 
competitive balance.
4 Syzmanski and Kesenné (2004) conversely, demonstrated that under 
reasonable circumstances increased levels of sharing gate revenue may worsen balance. 
  Empirical tests on the effects of revenue sharing are very scarce and equally 
inconclusive.  Atkinson et al. (1988) claim their results indicate that the equal revenue sharing of 
national television revenue in the National Football League (NFL) is consistent with better 
competitive balance.  Fort and Quirk (1995) provided evidence that competitive balance as 
measured by dispersion of club win percents has changed very little over time in any of the four 
major sports leagues.  They put forth, that regardless of revenue sharing and other institutional 
constraints (except salary-payroll caps) on player labor markets, competitive balance is largely 
invariant.  An impediment to empirical tests has been that the natural experiment where a 
                                                 
3 For a thorough review of the theoretical literature and much of the empirical work to date, see Sysmanski (2003). 
4 There is no particular consistency on exactly what are these circumstances. For example Rascher (1997) and 
Kessené (2000) show that if owners’ behavior is modeled as utility maximizing rather than profit maximizing 
revenue sharing improves balance. Atkinson et. al, (1988) on the other hand, claim exactly the opposite, and that 
utility maximizing behavior in the NFL causes greater imbalance.   
  5professional team-sport league has radically altered its revenue sharing plan is heretofore 
nonexistent.   
  Although revenue sharing or cross-subsidization has many potential arrangements, 
comparisons across leagues are difficult, if not inappropriate, because of institutional differences 
of far greater consequence than the alternative methods of sharing revenue.  The standard 
revenue sharing practice in US professional sports leagues is traditionally an even (1/n) split of 
central or league-collected income—comprised primarily of the revenues generated by national 
broadcast contracts, negotiated by the Commissioner’s office.  The National Basketball 
Association (NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL), prior to 2005-06, shared only league-
generated revenues.  The National Football League (NFL), like pre-1996 MLB, combines 
league-generated revenue with a home team-disproportionate split of the local gate.
5  The NHL 
joined MLB by also placing a tax on local revenue as part of a new collective bargaining 
agreement negotiated in 2005. 
  Changes in the distribution of playing talent across clubs are typically evaluated by 
assessing disparities in club payrolls over time, or by examination of variation in the statistical 
measures of competitive balance, such as the standard deviation of winning percentage.  We put 
forth the argument that empirical tests that focus on only these factors are too coarse to 
illuminate alterations in the distribution of talent that may result from the change of revenue 
sharing scheme.  Instead, an empirical analysis of player transfers between clubs offers a more 
thorough evaluation of alterations the talent flows and distributions brought on by changes in the 
revenue sharing method.  MLB’s new progressive scheme provides the rare opportunity to test 
the effects of revenue sharing given a significant institutional change in league revenue sharing 
policy.   
                                                 
5 In the NFL the home team keeps 60% of the gate with the remaining 40% pooled and redistributed in even shares. 
(Fort and Quirk 1995, p. 1286).  
  6  The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section provides the details of the revenue 
sharing aspects of the 1997BA and the 2003BA.  The following section offers a theoretical 
model comparing the progressive revenue redistribution with the more conventional straight pool 
plan and discerns the effects of each scheme on club owners’ incentives.  Presentation and 
discussion of empirical results on payroll dispersion, competitive balance, and regression 
analyses of player transfers comprises section four, which is followed by concluding remarks, 
and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. The MLB Revenue Sharing Plan 
  The 1997BA did not provide for an immediate and full adoption of the split pool revenue 
sharing plan. The split pool scheme was phased in gradually over the 1996-1999 seasons and 
was fully implemented for the 2000 and 2001 seasons.  Under the original formulation of the 
split pool method, twenty-percent of all club generated net revenue (primarily gate revenue, 
other stadium revenues, and local broadcasting revenue) was pooled with MLB league generated 
revenues—those collected directly by MLB, primarily from national broadcasting contracts, 
licensing, and royalties—for the purpose of redistribution.  The total MLB pooled revenue 
(called the central pool) was redistributed so that seventy-five percent was divided equally 
among all clubs. The remaining twenty-five percent was redistributed in full to the clubs 
generating a below-the-mean amount of local revenue, with the shares received inverse in 
proportion to the club’s revenue generation.
6
                                                 
6 The exact wording on the “split pool plan” from the 1997BA follows: (MLB, 1997 p.88) 
The "Split Pool Plan" operating at full (100%) implementation, the amount of net 
payment or net receipt for each Participating Club shall be determined as 
follows: Each Participating Club contributes 20% of its Net Local Revenue to a 
putative pool; 75% of that pool is divided equally among all Participating Clubs; 
the remaining 25% of the pool is divided only among Participating Clubs below 
the arithmetic mean of Net Local Revenue in proportion to each such Club's 
  7  Prior to full implementation, a hybrid plan was utilized on a sixty-percent basis for 1996 
and 1997; meaning that clubs received 60% of their best possible subsidy.  The split pool was 
executed at 80% in 1998 and 85% in 1999; signifying that each club’s net tax or subsidy was that 
percentage of the full split pool plan.
7  The 2003BA modified the split pool so that each club 
contributed thirty-four percent of their net local revenue, which was redistributed in even shares.  
However, clubs producing below-the-mean levels of local revenue receive progressively higher 
shares of the initial central fund— again the revenue collected directly by MLB including 
national broadcast revenue and revenue generated by MLB properties.  The redistribution 
process from the Central Fund Component (CFC) is indistinguishable from the split pool, in that 
it provides subsidy payments with an inverse relationship to revenue generation. However, the 
CFC share is determined by averaging local revenue over the most recent three-year period 
rather than an annual adjustment.  Those eligible for the CFC redistribution include all clubs that 
received a local pool redistribution payment that was greater than their contribution— designated 
                                                                                                                                                             
distance from said average, with the difference between each Club's payment 
into the putative pool and its receipt or receipts there from producing the net 
payment or net receipt for that Club. 
    Intent of the Plan: 
(a) NET TRANSFER VALUE. The intent of the revenue sharing plan is to effect 
a net transfer of Net Local Revenue among Participating Clubs of $70 Million at 
100% implementation of the plan, based on 1994 projections. 
(b) MARGINAL TAX RATE. The maximum marginal tax rate on Payor Clubs 
under the plan shall not exceed 20% at full (100%) implementation of the plan. 
 
7 During the phase-in period (planned) subsidies exceeded (planned) revenue collections.  In 1996 
“superstation” payments bridged the gap and from 1997-1999 the difference was made up with a league-
collected “luxury tax” placed on teams with the highest payrolls.
7 Those teams exceeding a 
predetermined payroll threshold ($51 Million in 1997, $55 Million in 1998, $59.8Million in 1999) were 
charged a tax of 35% of their payroll (34% in 1999). Additionally all teams were charged a 2.5% payroll 
tax for the 1996 and 1997 seasons. Superstation payments are those MLB received from the so-called 
superstation broadcast networks that televise MLB games nationally include Atlanta-based TBS and 
Chicago-based WGN. 
 
  8as payee clubs.  Payee clubs have produced average net local revenue that is below the league 
mean for each of the previous three seasons, to be eligible for the CFC subsidy.
8   
  Both subsidy systems pay the largest shares to clubs that generate the smallest amounts 
of local revenue.  On the surface this is the goal of an income redistribution plan, but it is not 
clear that income redistribution provides the proper incentives for clubs eligible to receive larger 
proportional shares to invest in talent and therefore improve competitive balance across the 
league.  The optimal outcome for a league that generates a positive economic return to a 
                                                 
8 The exact wording on the “Central Fund Component” from the 2003 BA follows: (MLB, 2003 p.102-3) 
The revenue sharing plan shall also have a “Central Fund Component” 
under which a portion of Major League Central Fund money will be 
reallocated from Payor Clubs to Payee Clubs. The amount of net 
payment or net receipt under the Central Fund Component for each Club 
shall be determined as follows: 
(a) Net Transfer Value. At 100% implementation, the net transfer value 
of the Central Fund Component, in each revenue sharing year, shall be 
41.066% of the net transfer value of the Base Plan in that revenue 
sharing year. “Net transfer value” shall mean the sum of the amounts 
transferred from Payor Clubs to Payee Clubs. 
(b) Contributors and Recipients. During each revenue sharing year, 
Major League Central Fund money shall be reallocated from Clubs that 
are Payor Clubs for that revenue sharing year (“Contributors”). 
Distributions under the Central Fund Component for each revenue 
sharing year shall be made only to Clubs that: (i) are Payee Clubs for that 
revenue sharing year, and (ii) have a mean Net Local Revenue for the 
preceding three revenue sharing years that is below the industry’s mean 
Net Local Revenue for that three-year period (“Recipients”). 
(c) Calculation 
(i) Contributors. To determine the amount of Major League Central Fund 
money to be reallocated from each Contributor (at 100% 
implementation), multiply the Contributor’s mean Net Local Revenue 
for the preceding three revenue sharing years by a fraction, the 
numerator of which is the net transfer value of the Central Fund 
Component in that revenue sharing year and the denominator of which is 
the sum of the means of each Contributor’s Net Local Revenue for the 
preceding three revenue sharing years. 
(ii) Recipients. To determine the amount of Major League Central Fund 
money to be distributed to each Recipient (at 100% implementation), 
multiply the net transfer value of the Central Fund Component in that 
revenue sharing year by a fraction, the numerator of which is the 
difference between the industry’s mean Net Local Revenue for the 
preceding three revenue sharing years and the Recipient’s mean Net 
Local  Revenue for that period, and the denominator of which is the sum 
of all such differences for each of the Recipients. 
 
  9marginal improvement in competitive balance logically occurs when clubs at the bottom of the 
scale improve their talent stock.  The potential problem is the creation of a negative externality 
by altering incentives, which encourage lower revenue producing clubs to restrain their 
investment in talent in order to collect a larger subsidy.  The undesirable consequence is twofold.  
First, the overall league-collected pool is smaller because of the lessened local contribution by 
such clubs.  Second, since winning theoretically produces more revenue, some clubs may choose 
not to invest in an adequate (efficient) level of talent and greater competitive imbalance results, 
also reducing total league revenue.
9 The theoretical model discerns the circumstances where 
progressive sharing creates a negative externality.  
 
3. Theoretical Model 
Models of straight pool and progressive revenue sharing plans employed by a sports 
league are incorporated.  The straight pool model is a modification of the model developed by 
Atkinson et al (1988) that assumes a league of n clubs, each with separate ownership.  The 
league objective is profit maximization by way of maximizing the profits of each club so that 








Club profits are simply the difference in total revenues, which includes all retained, locally 
generated, revenue plus all monies redistributed to each club through the leagues central fund 
CF, and total costs so that 
(2)  i π  = TRi - TCi.           
                                                 
9 The 2007BA, which runs through the 2011 championship season has purports to have resolved the short term 
incentive problems of increasing marginal tax rate. The new agreement  sets the CFC distribution for each club at a 
fixed rate throughout the period. The plan reflects a straight pool (see Zimbalist, 2006). All clubs contribute 31% of 
their net local revenue and the CFC is redistributed so that the overall effect replicates a 48% straight pool.  
  10Each club’s local revenue LRi is a function of its win percent w, which is in turn a function of its 
talent investment t, and local demand characteristics Di including metropolitan population, per 
capita income, and stadium factors. So that 
(3)   LRi (w(t)Di) .            
The profit function for a club in a league employing straight pool revenue sharing is modeled as 
follows 
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where α  is the fraction of revenue each club contributes to the pool. For the sake of simplicity, 
only the variable cost of talent is included in the cost function. The talent market is assumed to 
have a finite number of players, and thus represents a zero sum game, as talent hired by one club 
is denied the others. The variable costs cti are determined as the number of units of talent hired at 
a cost of c per unit.  For cases where a luxury tax/competitive balance tax is placed on payrolls 
exceeding a threshold, the cost function is represented as TC = cti +μ(ρcti), where ρ designates 
the tax rate, and μ = 1 for clubs exceeding the payroll threshold and 0 otherwise. 
Alternatively, the profit function for clubs in a league employing a progressive sharing 
scheme, returning disproportionately large shares to those with below-the-mean local revenues, 
is as follows, 
(5) 
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where λ = 1 if LR  >  i LR ; 0 otherwise.  The weighting term, δi, indicates that those clubs 
receiving a portion of the subsidy pool do not receive equal 1/n shares.  The share is larger for 
smaller amounts of local revenue generated, so that 





Although local revenue is also determined in part by such factors as the effort applied to selling 
broadcast rights, stadium signage, luxury boxes, and other marketing efforts, this model will 
limit the club’s problem to its choice of a revenue maximizing level of talent to maximize the 
objective functions in (4) and (5). 
The first order condition for the straight pool plan is 
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  Signing (6) reveals a positive first term offset by negative second and third terms.  The 
negative second term may provide the necessary disincentive that internalizes the externality 
caused by the over investment in talent by the top revenue generating clubs.  The negative third 
term shows that the luxury tax reduces the incentive to hire talent beyond the payroll threshold. 
The first order condition for the progressive redistribution plan is 
(7) 



















































































    
  Equation (7) adds an additional term, the product of β α λ ) 1 ( − , reflecting the change in 
the secondary pool share given a change in talent level for below-the-mean revenue producing 
clubs. This term signs negative and indicates a decreased incentive toward talent investment for 
the pertinent clubs. The first part of the term shows that increasing talent increases local revenue 
and reduces the club’s share of pooled revenue. The second part of the term shows that when a 
club increases its level of talent, other clubs’ local revenue decline and their shares of the pool 
increase, reducing the amount left over for club i. 
  12  The progressive redistribution theoretically creates greater incentive for below-the-mean 
revenue clubs to divest in talent than is the case for a straight pool system. If low revenue clubs 
respond to this incentive, the progressive redistribution plans create an unnecessary negative 
externality by increasing competitive imbalance.  Nevertheless, for that to happen the gains from 
divesting (terms two and three and four) must exceed the returns to investing in talent (term 
one). Verification requires empirical tests. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
  A simple test of the hypothesis is an examination of revenue and payroll disparity before 
and after the implementation of progressive revenue sharing.  Table 1 shows statistics from 1990 
through 2005 championship seasons.  Reported are calculations of the coefficient of variation on 
payroll and total revenue dispersion (after redistribution since 1996) and gate revenue dispersion, 
the best available proxy for local revenue variation.
10 There is evidence of increased payroll 
dispersion throughout the progressive revenue sharing period. The Montreal Expos (Washington 
Nationals since 2005), the club with the lowest payroll in four of the six years immediately 
following the implementation of progressive revenue sharing, actually cut their club payroll from 
$18 million to $8 million dollars between the 1997 and 1998 championship seasons. The Tampa 
Bay Devil Rays either had, the lowest, or second from the lowest, club payroll throughout the 
duration of the 2003BA; and they nearly halved their payroll from $35Million to $19Million to 
start the 2003 season.  A recent example of apparently flagrant divestment is the Florida Marlins, 
who reduced their payroll from $60Million to $15Million prior to the 2006 championship 
season. These examples support the claims of some high-revenue club owners, such as the New 
                                                 
10 Data on MLB club finances, including breakdowns by revenue source is complied from a variety of sources and 
collected at  Rodney Fort’s Sports Business Data Pages. Sources include Financial World 1990-1996, Forbes1997-
2005, MLB Commissioner’s Office 2001. The revenue source data are not consistent through the time period in 
regard to total local revenue by club. It is variously reported only before revenue sharing, only after revenue sharing, 
or not at all. Total gate revenue produced by each club is reported consistently throughout the period. 
  13York Yankees George Steinbrenner, that there is no reinvestment of revenue sharing funds in 
talent by the payee club owners, and the result is an inferior product on the field.  Nonetheless, 
supporters of revenue sharing claim that low payroll clubs are investing more aggressively in 
their minor league farm systems and are therefore better able to field more talented clubs over 
the long run.
11
  In general, the payroll statistics provide some support for the proposal that progressive 
revenue sharing has caused low revenue producing clubs to reduce their investments in talent.  
The coefficient of variation for total revenue since progressive revenue sharing is consistent with 
prior averages, indicating that revenue sharing has alleviated growing disparities in revenue 
production over the period.  However, the coefficient of variation for gate revenue has increased 
significantly since the implementation of progressive revenue sharing; this mirrors the trend in 
payroll dispersion, implying that gate revenue is an important driver of talent acquisition 
decisions.   
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
  Notwithstanding, payroll dispersion when used as a measure of talent distribution in 
MLB is problematic.  Prior studies have examined this phenomenon.  Zimbalist (1992) Quirk 
and Fort (1999) and Hall et al. (2002) find very low levels of correlation between payrolls and 
winning, though the latter does find that this correlation is stronger since 1994.  A likely cause of 
this incongruous association is MLB’s multi-tiered labor market, which distorts the connection 
between payroll and talent.  Only free agent eligible players, those with six or more years of 
MLB service, receive a wage reflecting a competitive market.  Other players, bound to their 
clubs by a contractual reserve clause, earn below their market value.
12  Furthermore, a club’s 
payroll does not accurately reflect its investment in talent.  Investments in scouting and player 
                                                 
11 See Associated Press (2004) for examples of both types of comments. 
 
12 This is well documented in the literature. See Zimbalist (1994) for example. 
  14development costs must also be given consideration.  Clubs that have invested poorly in player 
development, often end up paying more for similar levels of talent, as they are compelled to 
invest disproportionately in higher priced free agents.
13   Examination of actual on-field 
measures of competitive balance provides additional insight. 
  Vrooman (1996) offers that there are three dimensions by which to gauge competitive 
balance. These include closeness of within season competition, discontinuity of club 
performance from season to season, and minimal large market dominance (small market 
weakness).  Quirk and Fort’s (1992) ratio of actual to ideal standard deviation of win percent 
(SDWP) is the standard metric used to test the former, and had been used in numerous studies 
measuring competitive balance.  Season-to-season continuity is a more ambiguous concept, and 
calculations of frequency, or dispersion of, championships, playoff appearances, etc. fall into this 
category. Quirk and Fort (1992) provide a wealth of historical data of this sort for all four North 
American professional sports leagues. Fort (2001) also reports detailed statistics on the 
distribution of championships for MLB through 2000. 
  Consistency of club standings also falls within the category of season-to-season 
continuity.  Daly and Moore (1981) and Maxcy (2002) employ the Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
Coefficient (SRCC) to test year- to-year changes in club standings.  Humphreys (2002) provides 
a thorough review of other methods that attempt to capture season-to-season change.  He also 
introduces the Competitive Balance Ratio (CBR) that is a ratio of within season standard 
deviation of league win percent, and standard deviation of club win percents of a determined 
period of time. Hadley, Ciecka, and Krautmann (2005) develop an inter-seasonal measure of 
                                                 
13 Hall et al. (2002) also identify the uncompetitive aspects of the MLB labor market for the lack of correlation. 
They offer a somewhat different explanation stating diminished player movement by trade in the free agent era is 
the crux of the problem.  That observation is open for debate. Maxcy (2002) for example finds that the mobility 
rates of productive players have increased significantly in the free agent era. 
  15competitive balance based on a Markov model of a team’s probability of qualifying for 
postseason play given the performance of the team in the previous season. 
Table 2 shows SDWP and SRCC for each the 1990-2005 championship seasons.  Imbalance 
shows a statistically significant increase starting in 1997.  These findings are consistent with Fort 
(2001) and Humphreys’ (2002) CBR results, and Hadley, Ciecka, and Krautmann (2005), who 
each detect an statistically significant increase in imbalance since 1995.  Once more, the results 
impart corroboration that split pool revenue sharing provided improper incentives for low 
revenue clubs. Nonetheless, the number of observation years is too few to validate a conclusion, 
and coupled with the increased gate revenue dispersion greater levels of imbalance is expected, 
regardless of an altered revenue sharing plan.  Additionally, the progressive schemes introduced 
by each collective bargaining agreement are different enough to warrant separate examination.  
 (INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE) 
  Imbalance as reflected large market dominance/small market weakness is not at the 
forefront of economic analysis, although Daly and Moore (1981) and Vrooman (1996) have 
given it consideration. In each case, the authors found that increased labor market freedom has 
amplified talent flow toward larger markets.
14  The issue is the crux of MLB’s case that 
competitive imbalance is a growing problem. The BRPR cites as evidence the very limited 
ability of clubs outside the top payroll quartiles to obtain post-season success since 1995.  Their 
results, though not manifestly refutable, rely on a flawed line of reasoning that implies both that 
payroll is highly correlated with revenue generation and that the payroll/revenue quartiles are 
static in membership.  Although there is little doubt that clubs in markets with greater revenue 
                                                 
14 Vrooman offers the curious observation that the increased movement of free agents towards large markets is 
responsible for improving standard measures of competitive balance. Talented small market clubs are broken up 
more quickly and brought back to mediocrity. Many of the larger market clubs who sign free agents do so 
inefficiently and do not obtain gains corresponding to the small market clubs’ losses.  The result is that all parties 
wallow in mediocrity. This provides strong measurements of balance, but may be detrimental to the overall product. 
  16potential have historically been more successful, the test here is to determine whether 
progressive revenue sharing has augmented the problem. 
  The definitive empirical examination tracks actual player movement between clubs.  The 
initial test is to determine whether progressive revenue sharing, in both formulations, has altered 
transfer dynamics in MLB, all else constant. The effects of progressive revenue sharing on the 
flows of transferring players between clubs, based on revenue characteristics and club quality 
separately, for each of the three collective bargaining agreements represented in the sample 
period, are further analyzed.  Should productive players be more likely to transfer away from, 
and less likely to transfer toward, lower revenue producing clubs, all else constant, support is 
provided for the hypothesis that progressive revenue sharing brings on negative incentives for 
low revenue clubs to procure talent.   
  The data are derived from the set of 10,270 player-year observations for all MLB 
position-players from the 1990 through the 2005 championship seasons. We eliminate the 1,795 
players that exited MLB the season immediately following the observation year.  The sample is 
further restricted to statistically relevant performance statistics by eliminating all observations 
representing fewer than thirty plate appearances.
15  The analysis presented here also removes all 
within-season transfers, so as to focus on only the between-season labor market.  The final 
analysis represents a total of 6,935 player year observations, and includes 1,790 trades, sales, and 
free agent signings completed during the inter-season trading markets each year.
16  
  Club-year characteristics that reveal motivation for participation in the between-season 
labor market are the focus of the analysis.  The inter-season transfer market, comprised primarily 
of trades and free agent signings, is motivated by the club’s assessment of each player’s marginal 
                                                 
15 Players year observations representing for the fifty-one transfers to expansion clubs in 1994 and 1998 are also 
eliminated because club differences cannot be calculated or estimated. 
16 For the inter-season analysis player-year observations individual performance statistics reflect seasonal totals and 
one observation per player per year. 
  17revenue product (MRP).  Players move toward their high-value user given this market is 
sufficiently lacking restrictions.  Without significant disparity in revenue generating potential, 
variation in clubs’ current talent quality drives the market.  A productive player’s expected 
marginal product will be greater for lower performing clubs setting in motion a natural flow of 
talent from better to worse performing clubs.  Likewise, when variation in revenue generation is 
included in the equation, talent flows toward higher revenue producers are expected, because a 
player’s expected MRP increases in such cases.   
  In order to evaluate whether progressive revenue sharing has altered the flow of talent 
between teams, the variables win percent and normalized gate revenue for the clubs employing 
the player in the seasons surrounding the transfer are incorporated.
17 Variables on player 
characteristics, performance, and league modifications expected a priori to influence the 
likelihood of transfer are included for each observation. Individual player attributes include 
measures of performance and playing time, negotiation status, and whether the player has 
previously transferred.  LOGIT models test the significance of these factors to the probability 
that a given player transfers to another club.   
(8) TRANSFERit= β0 + β1 FA +β2PRESWITCHit + β3PRODit + β4NLt + 
β5TEAMSt + β61997BA + β72003BA + β8WINtit +β9WINtit+1 +β10GATEtit 
+β11GATEtit+1+ e.                           
The variables are defined as follows. 
TRANSFERit: A binomial dummy variable, coded 1 if the player-year observation indicates a 
transfer to another MLB club with the succeeding observation, 0 otherwise. 
FA it: A binomial dummy variable, coded 1 if the player year observation indicates free agent 
status at the completion of year t, 0 otherwise. Players with six or more years of MLB service are 
                                                 
17 Gate revenue is chosen as a proxy for local revenue as it is the best revenue source for which data is available 
throughout the entire sample period. 
  18granted free agent status at the end of a current contract and may initiate transfers, while others 
may transfer only at club discretion. Free agent status is also granted to significant number of 
players following their release by a club. Player transaction records, as reported by 
Retrosheet.org, do not distinguish the two types of free agents. 
PRESWITCHit: A binomial dummy variable, coded 1 if the player year observation indicates a 
previous transfer so that the player was no longer with his original MLB club to start year t, 0 
otherwise. A player who has never transferred may have greater firm specific human capital, or 
clubs may act irrationally to sunk costs, as they have more player development costs invested in 
players trained in their minor league systems. Either scenario yields an a priori positive 
coefficient estimate. 
PRODit: A vector of variables that indicate the player’s production during the observation year.  
Slugging Average (SA) is employed to capture skill independent of club factors. Plate 
appearances (PA) (projected to 162 game estimates for the strike-shortened 1994 and 1995 
seasons) specify a playing time aspect of performance.  
WINtit: The win percent of player i’s year t club in year t.  
 WINtit+1: The win percent of player i’s year t+1club in year t. 
GATEtit: The normalized gate revenue (the ratio of each club’s total gate revenue to the MLB 
mean gate revenue for each year t) player i’s year t club in year t. 
GATEtit+1: The normalized gate revenue of player i’s year t+1 club in year t. 
TEAMSt: The total number of MLB clubs in each observation year. (1990-92, n = 26; 1993-97, n 
= 28; 1998-2005, n = 30). An increase in the number of clubs potentially increases the pool of 
potential trading partners.   
NLt: A binomial dummy variable coded 1 for player-year observations on National League clubs 
in year t and 0 for American League clubs. A significant rule difference, potentially affecting 
  19talent flows, is that American League clubs employ a designated hitter. The expectation is that 
this may increase the flow of older talent, or those otherwise less able to play a fielding position 
away from NL clubs. 
90-96BA: A dummy variable representing the sample years not effected by progressive revenue 
sharing. The years 1990-1996 are coded 1, and coded 0 otherwise. 
1997BA: A dummy variable capturing the effects of the 1997 Basic Agreement. The years 1997-
2002 are coded 1, and coded 0 otherwise. 
2003BA: A dummy variable capturing the effects of the 2003 Basic Agreement. The years 2003-
2005 are coded 1, and coded 0 otherwise.  
e: disturbance term  E(e) = 0 and Var (e) = σe
2. 
  The 2005 player year observations include a TRANSFER code for players based on their 
club assignment for the 2006 season.  Therefore, all between-season trading and signing periods 
covered by the 2003BA are included. 
  To isolate the specific effects of each progressive revenue plan on talent flows, a LOGIT 
equation incorporating interaction is constructed. 
(9)   TRANSFERit= β0 + β1 FA +β2PRESWITCHit + β3PRODit + +β4NLt + 
β5TEAMSt + β690-96BA*WINtit + β71997BA*WINtit + 
β82003BA*WINtit+β990-96BA*WINtit+1+ β101997BA*WINtit+1+ 
β112003BA*WINtit+1 + β1290-96BA*GATEtit+ β131997BA*GATEtit + 
β142003BA*GATEtit +β1590-96BA*GATEtit+1 + β161997BA*GATEtit+1+ 
β172003BA*GATEtit+1 +eit.                             
  The variables corresponding to β6  — β17  replace the variables WIN and GATE with 
interaction variables created as the product of each WIN and GATE and the binomial value 
representing each of the three collective bargaining periods.  Negative coefficient estimates for 
  20GATEtit indicate the probability of transfer increases for players on lower revenue clubs; and 
negative coefficient estimates for GATEtit+1 indicate the probability of transfer decreases for 
players moving toward lower revenue clubs.   Should the interaction terms corresponding to each 
progressive revenue sharing period reveal greater coefficient estimates, there is substantiation 
that progressive revenue sharing has amplified the large market dominance/small market failure 
dimension of competitive balance.  Summary statistics for the all years, and separately for each 
collective bargaining period, are reported in Table 3.  
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
  The summary statistics show that transfer rates increased significantly with each 
successive collective bargaining period.  Statistics are shown for the full sample, and for players 
in the top performance quartile each season, as determined by a simple sum of their plate 
appearances and slugging average (multiplied by 1,000).  The top quartile of productive players 
have lower transfer rates, but clearly this group also reflects the trend of increased transfers since 
the implementation of the 2003BA.  Also of note, when comparing each period, are the 
significant variation in the mean performance variables.  Performance averages increased 
significantly for all groups during the 1997BA period.  The 2003BA period shows a modest 
decline in slugging average for the top quartile in comparison to the 1997BA period, but 
averages continue to exceed the years before progressive revenue sharing.  Variation in the win 
percent statistics show that on average players transfer to lesser clubs, except during the 
1997BA.  The gate revenue statistics shows that players transfer to clubs with greater revenue. 
This trend is significantly amplified for both groupings of players with the 2003BA.  
  The LOGIT regression estimates for model one are reported in Tables 4. The coefficient 
estimates are adjusted for heteroskedacticity.  Given that summary statistics reveal considerably 
more variation in production and GATE, between collective bargaining periods, the assumption 
  21is logical. Although the adjustments do not always yield statistically significant results, each 
equation reflects the correction. 
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
  The regression results are consistent with the a priori predictions.  Free agents and 
players that have previously changed clubs are significantly more likely to transfer. Lower levels 
of performance indicate a greater likelihood of transfer. The results imply that players transfer 
away from NL clubs and provide tepid evidence that players are more likely to transfer with the 
addition of more clubs.  The regression coefficient estimates for WIN indicate that players are 
more likely to transfer from clubs with higher, to clubs with lower, win percentages and this is 
most evident for the most productive quartile. The estimates for GATE indicate that all groupings 
of players are more likely to transfer from clubs with lower, to clubs with and higher, gate 
revenues.  Both results are consistent with an MRP explanation motivating transfers. Positive 
coefficient values are consistent for 1997BA and 2003BA indicating that, all else constant, the 
probability of transfer has increased with the implementation of progressive revenue sharing, 
most visibly for productive players, since the implementation of the 2003 BA.   
   Model 2 estimates, which include the interaction terms, are shown in Table 5, and reveal 
more definitive conclusions about the effects of progressive revenue sharing on talent flows.  
First, the movement from higher to lower win percent clubs is amplified considerably with the 
2003BA.  This in context with the deviation in the GATE coefficient estimates indicates a 
categorical alteration of talent flows. Most importantly, the lower club revenue, the more likely 
top quartile players are to transfer from that club, in both periods of progressive revenue sharing. 
Prior to 1997, there is no indication that the gate revenue of the player’s current team affected 
likelihood of transfer.  Furthermore, for the entire set of observations, and those in the top 
  22quartile, the probability of transfer toward higher gate revenue clubs, indicated by GATEtit+1, 
increased significantly with the 1997BA.  The moderation of this trend consistent with the 
2003BA suggests the reformulated luxury tax of that collective bargaining agreement was 
effective.  Although the results in Table 5 indicate a definitive alteration of talent flows, there is 
no particular explanation for the overall increase in transfer rates. Nonetheless, revealed is a 
primary piece of evidence to support the hypothesis that progressive revenue sharing has altered 
talent flows in such a way that competitive balance is adversely affected.  Since the 
implementation of progressive revenue sharing, the most productive talent is more likely to flow 
away from lower revenue producing clubs and toward higher revenue producing clubs. Whereas, 
prior to 1997, revenue differences between clubs involved in the transfer of a player was not a 
significant factor.   
  The above analysis indicates a significant alteration in the talent movement given the 
changes brought about by progressive revenue sharing.  Notwithstanding, isolation of the effects 
on the lowest revenue producing clubs is in need of further corroboration.  Clubs in the lowest 
revenue quartile are argued to have the greatest incentive to reduce their level of talent 
procurement. For the purpose of isolating these groups, the sample was restricted to transfer 
observations only, and dependent variables are developed to indicate the player has transferred 
either to or from revenue quartile four.  The dependent variable indicates, that given a player has 
transferred, the probability of transfer to or from a quartile four team. 
(10)  REVQnt =β0 + β1 FA +β2PRESWITCHit + β3PRODit + β4NLt + β5TEAMSt + β61997BA 
+ β72003BA + β8WINtit +β9WINtit+1 +β10GATEtit +β11GATEtit+1+ e.  
Where REVQnt  is defined as, respectively:      
  23REVQ4t: A dummy variable coded 1 for clubs in the bottom total revenue generating quartile for 
the observation year (the lowest six revenue producers in 1990-92 and the lowest seven 1993-
2005) 0 otherwise. The variable indicates that the player transferred from a quartile four club. 
REVQ4t+1: A dummy variable coded 1 for the player’s t+1 club when in the bottom revenue 
generating quartile for the observation year t. 0 otherwise. The variable indicates that the player 
transferred to a quartile four club. 
  Estimates for these models for all transfer observations and observations for players in 
the top two performance quartiles are shown in Tables 6A and 6B. 
(INSERT TABLE 6A & 6B ABOUT HERE) 
  The results provide discernible support for the hypothesis.  Table 6A clearly indicates 
that since progressive revenue sharing, players that transfer are significantly less likely to move 
to quartile four clubs. Table 6B presents a conundrum.  Since to progressive revenue sharing, 
transferring players are significantly less likely to leave quartile four clubs, although the 
difference waned somewhat since the 2003BA. Perhaps this indicates that quartile four clubs 
have increasingly fewer players of value to higher revenue clubs.  The combination of slowed 
movements both toward and away low gate revenue clubs indicates less participation in the inter-
season labor market relative to other clubs, even as overall market activity has increased over 
time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the progressive revenue sharing has created an 
incentive for low revenue clubs to divest their talent. Taken as a whole, the results provide 
considerable support that the provisions of progressive revenue sharing have clearly altered the 
incentives in regard talent procurement for low revenue producers. A corresponding, increase in 
payroll dispersion and competitive imbalance over this period provides support for the 
hypothesis that the changes were not as intended, by those hoping for an improvement in 
  24competitive balance.  There is evidence that progressive revenue sharing created a disincentive 
to win for low revenue producing clubs.   
 
5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
  The results imply that flow of talent is significantly altered with progressive revenue 
sharing.  The outcome is a mildly adverse effect on overall competitive balance when compared 
to the immediately preceding years.  The analysis also presents some challenges. The revenue 
dispersion statistics show growing imbalance in gate revenue and improved variation in total 
revenue, yet only after redistribution. This brings about additional questions about the 
relationship between club revenue sources, incentives to win, and payroll. 
  Logically the revenue elasticity to winning varies considerably across revenue sources. 
Gate revenue is theoretically highly winning-elastic. Local broadcast revenue, given long-term 
contracts, is expected to be less elastic. Given profit-maximizing assumptions about owners, 
revenue from central sources should be unrelated to winning or perhaps, as has been shown here, 
inversely related to winning.  Rigorous analysis of the connection between the effect of winning 
and the associated incentives toward talent procurement on the various revenue streams and the 
correlation between those revenue streams and payroll may yield better-informed conclusions 
about the effects of both in-place and proposed revenue sharing plans. 
  Additionally much analysis of sports leagues has had an implicit single period 
orientation.  The puzzles of why low revenue clubs actually increase their payroll, why some 
middle to high revenue clubs—Cleveland and Baltimore during the studied time period for 
example—periodically make significant payroll reductions.  Furthermore, the effects of the 
luxury tax may be better understood given a multi-period analysis.  Intra-season transfers, not 
evaluated here, theoretically imply that clubs have routinely shown a willingness to trade present 
  25wins for future wins. It is likely that the progressive subsidies have increased the opportunity 
cost of present wins for some clubs.  Perhaps low revenue clubs took the opportunity to divest 
and collect a large subsidy, which is reinvested by developing young talent for the future.  Low 
revenue clubs such as Minnesota, and Florida, showed considerably improved on-field 
performance, since the 2001 season. Others, such as Kansas City and Tampa Bay, wallowed at 
the bottom of payroll rankings and the standings throughout the progressive sharing era. 
Analysis of talent flows over time by club, and the relationship to winning and various revenue 
streams, may shed additional light on these issues. 
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  287. Tables 
TABLE 1 
    Coefficient of Variation   
Year   Payroll  Total Revenue  Gate Revenue 
1990 0.222  0.304  0.374 
1991 0.252  0.289  0.367 
1992 0.304  0.281  0.364 
1993 0.304  0.256  0.333 
1994 0.263  0.292  0.339 
1995 0.278  0.387  0.417 
1996 0.314  0.300*  0.477 
1997 0.339  0.334*  0.525 
1998 0.375  0.327*  0.528 
1999 0.445  0.329*  0.530 
2000 0.393  0.292*  0.525 
2001 0.379  0.296*  0.491 
2002 0.366  0.291*  0.558 
2003 0.396  0.248*  0.578 
2004 0.475  0.254*  0.619 
2005 0.469  0.210*  0.546 
90-2005  0.348 0.293  0.475 




(T Value Difference)  -6.27 -0.694  -7.19 
                  * After redistribution of pooled revenues, a significant at the .01 level 
TABLE 2 
Competitive Balance Measures 
  Standard Deviation of Win Percent  Spearman's Rank Coefficient 
Year AL  NL  MLB  AL  NL  MLB 
1990  0.057 0.057 0.057  0.171  -0.059  0.065 
1991  0.061 0.061 0.061  0.468  -0.374  0.079 
1992  0.063 0.066 0.064  0.369  0.157  0.271 
1993  0.055 0.093 0.073  -0.020  0.112  0.046 
1994  0.068 0.072 0.058  0.527  0.475  0.501 
1995  0.083 0.060 0.071  0.189  0.431  0.310 
1996  0.069 0.056 0.062  0.673  0.429  0.551 
1997 0.062  0.058  0.06  0.490  0.136  0.313 
1998  0.081 0.088 0.085  0.234  0.440  0.343 
1999  0.076 0.079 0.077  0.835  0.531  0.673 
2000  0.054 0.069 0.061  0.512  0.543  0.528 
2001 0.095  0.065  0.08  0.714  0.462  0.580 
2002  0.106 0.081 0.091  0.732  0.810  0.774 
2003  0.098 0.070 0.083  0.835  0.653  0.738 
2004  0.083 0.086 0.083  0.415  0.697  0.566 
2005  0.081 0.055 0.067  0.789  0.609  0.693 
90-2005  0.074 0.070 0.071  0.496  0.378  0.439 
90-96  0.065 0.066 0.064  0.340  0.167  0.260 







*Difference in means before and after progressive revenue sharing 
a significant at the 0.01 level, b significant at the 0.05 level, 





  1990-2005      1990-1996    





Observations   
2920 
Observations 
 738  
Observations 
  Mean SD  Mean SD    Mean SD  Mean  SD 
TRANSFER  0.258 0.438 0.160 0.367    0.231 0.421  0.150  0.358 
FA  0.183 0.387 0.127 0.333    0.180 0.384  0.134  0.341 
PRESWITCH  0.498 0.500 0.485 0.500    0.446 0.497  0.427  0.495 
SA  0.406 0.093 0.485 0.074    0.393 0.092  0.469  0.071 
PA  366.7 212.9 632.5 67.2    357.7 209.8  619.5  69.1 
NL  0.509 0.500 0.472 0.499    0.487 0.500  0.442  0.497 
TEAMS  28.7 1.517 28.7  1.5    27.2 0.99  27.2  0.99 
WINtit 0.499 0.071 0.513 0.069  0.499 0.063  0.509  0.065 
WINtit+1 0.498 0.071 0.512 0.069  0.498 0.064  0.508  0.064 
GATEtit 0.998 0.470 1.061 0.511  0.998 0.378  1.051  0.404 
GATEtit+1 1.001 0.473 1.075 0.511  0.999 0.376  1.051  0.404 
              
  1997-2002       2003-2005   
 
Full 










  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean  SD 
TRANSFER  0.262 0.440 0.147 0.354  0.310 0.463  0.210  0.408 
FA  0.168 0.374 0.111 0.315  0.219 0.414  0.141  0.349 
PRESWITCH  0.532 0.499 0.521 0.500  0.542 0.498  0.541  0.499 
SA  0.415 0.094 0.499 0.077  0.416 0.089  0.491  0.067 
PA  370.1 214.9 640.9 65.6  379.6  214.7  644.2  61.20 
NL  0.525 0.499 0.493 0.500  0.526 0.500  0.498  0.501 
TEAMS  29.7 0.73  29.7 0.73  30  0.00  30  0.00 
WINtit 0.499 0.076 0.515 0.073  0.499 0.076  0.520  0.070 
WINtit+1 0.499 0.075 0.515 0.073  0.496 0.078  0.514  0.074 
GATEtit 0.999 0.515 1.057 0.540  0.997 0.550  1.092  0.644 
GATEtit+1 1.005 0.517 1.077 0.538  0.999 0.563  1.122  0.648 
 
  30  31
TABLE 4 
Dependent Variable: TRANSFER 
 
  Full sample: N=6935  Quartile 1: N=1745 
  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 











b 0.035 0.000 0.761 
NL  0.119
c 0.061 0.171 0.279 
TEAMS  0.046 0.255 0.068 0.501 
1997BA  0.263














Heteroskadsticity Correction   
Year=97-02  -0.070 0.223 -0.164 0.126 
Year=03-05  -0.105 0.121 -0.413
a 0.001 
McFadden (Pseudo R
2)  0.242      0.356 
 
a significant at the 0.01 level, b significant at the 0.05 level, c significant at the 0.1 level 
  
 TABLE 5 
Dependent Variable: TRANSFER 
  Full sample: N=6935  Quartile 1: N=1745 
  Coefficient P-Value  Coefficient P-Value 











b 0.033 0.0002  0.881 
NL  0.122
c 0.057 0.179  0.242 
TEAMS  0.038 0.341 0.024  0.814 
90BA*WINtit 0.017 0.983 2.655  0.252 




90BA*WINtit+1 -1.201 0.133 -8.130
a 0.001 





90BA*GATEtit -0.077 0.608 -0.206  0.528 










03BA*GATEtit+1 0.160 0.257 0.920
a 0.003 
Heteroskadsticity Correction      
Year=97-02  -0.064 0.271 -0.243
b 0.039 
Year=03-05  -0.109 0.108 -0.550
a 0.000 
McFadden (Pseudo R
2)  0.243   0.369 
 















Revenue Quartile Models for  
Dependent Variable: Transfers to Quartile 4 
 
  Full sample 
Performance 
Quartiles 1&2 








FA  -0.004 0.970  -0.114 0.626 
PRESWITCH  -0.006 0.963  -0.015 0.953 
SA  -0.417 0.581  -1.438 0.480 
PA  -0.0003 0.390 -0.0004 0.660 
NL  -0.043 0.698  -0.120 0.573 






b 0.012 -0.320 0.540 
WINtit 0.670 0.474  -0.923 0.569 
WINtit+1 1.085 0.187  1.387 0.351 












2)  0.613 0.658 
 
a significant at the 0.01 level, b significant at the 0.05 level, c significant at the 0.1 level 




Revenue Quartile Models for  
Dependent Variable: Transfers from Quartile 4 
 
Full sample: 
N = 1790 
Performance Quartiles 
1&2 
N = 715 




FA  0.163 0.405 0.166  0.613 
PRESWITCH  -0.166 0.451 -0.108  0.758 
SA  0.265 0.818 -2.703  0.291 








a 0.009 -0.906  0.137 
2003BA  -0.626 0.132 -0.508  0.444 
WINtit 1.869 0.225 -2.204  0.451 




GATEtit+1 -0.001 0.998 0.130  0.750 
Heteroskadsticity Correction       
Year=97-02  0.147
c 0.075 0.149 0.352 
Year=03-05  -0.279 0.139 -0.291 0.328 
McFadden (Pseudo R
2) 0.576 0.602 
 
a significant at the 0.01 level, b significant at the 0.05 level, c significant at the 0.1 level 